French Labor Relations: A Functional Analysis by unknown
French Labor Relations: A Functional Analysis
The French system of labor relations, like so many things French,
is quite distinctive. It would be barely comprehensible to the Ameri-
can worker in its de-emphasis on collective bargaining, its multiplicity
of union divisions and alliances, and its reliance on labor courts to
settle individual grievances. French unions are weak in terms of mem-
bers and strike funds; until recently dues collection within the plant
had been prohibited; the closed shop is illegal. Collective agreements
are rarely concluded at the plant level; and regional accords meet-
ing certain statutory requirements may be extended by government
decree to cover an entire industry, including parties who did not
participate in the negotiations.
In view of such striking differences, the French system seems worthy
of more comprehensive analysis than it has thus far received. More-
over, a wave of recent innovations stemming from the unrest of 1968
may suggest additional points of comparison between the French
and American systems. This Note will attempt to provide a general
description of the French system, assessing its strengths and weak-
nesses. It will then recast that description in terms of the framework
of functional analysis-a mode of perception which may suggest a
different way in which to view industrial relations, both foreign and
domestic.
I. The French Labor Relations System
A. The Participants
The Unions. There has long been a disparity between the theory
and 'reality of French union structure.' In theory, power is decen-
tralized, with the local, the basic unit, closely controlled by its mem-
bers. In reality, however, local independence and membership con-
trol are weak. Power resides principally in regional organizations,
which cut across industries and are pivotal in bargaining and strikes.2
Officials of these organizations, which comprise all the locals of one
1. For a statement of this theory, and an assertion of this disparity almost twenty
years ago, see V. LORWIN, THE FRENCH LAnOR MOVEMENT 146 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as LORWIN].
2. For example, the C.G.T. metals unions form the powerful Metal Workers Council
of the Paris Region.
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confederation in a given region, typically represent the union on
public regulatory, mediation, and advisory agencies; they assist locals
in organization, strikes, and negotiations.
The three major confederations-the Communist dominated Con-
federation G~nrale du Travail (C.G.T.); the Christian trade move-
ment's descendant, the Conf~dration Fran~aise D~mocratique du
Travail (C.F.D.T.); and the predominantly white-collar Confedera-
tion Gn6rale des Cadres (C.G.C.)3-are formally responsible for deter-
mining national policy and for dealing with the national government.
But they are often out of touch with their constituent units, the re-
gional organizations and unions, and today, as two decades ago, "Gov-
ernment, whether of state or trade unions still inspires distrust."'
However, the confederations have recently emphasized the need for
contact with workers, spontaneous action by constituent organizations,
and priority for rank-and-file grievances,a and this may suggest some
improvement in the level of communications between the rank-and-
file and national labor leaders.
Employers. By all accounts, the managers of France's great corpora-
tions constitute as unrepentant a group of nineteenth century indus-
trial barons as remain in the West. Resenting the very presence of
unions in the plant, these managers would rather see reforms imposed
by the government than by concessions to labor demands.
The employer federation, the Conseil National du Patronat Fran-
ais (C.N.P.F.), unites management into a group more cohesive than
3. Among workers, the C.G.T. received about forty-five percent of the vote for cm-
ployee representatives; the C.F.D.T., twenty percent; the C.G.C., five percent, with the
remainder split among splinter and unaffiliated unions. Blanc-Jouvan, The Settlement
of Labor Disputes in France, in LABoR CoURTS AND GRIEVANCE SETrLE.tE.'r IN WESTEmN
EuROPE 5 (B. Aaron ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Blanc.Jouvan]. Yet it has been esti-
mated that all French unions still organize only fifteen to twenty percent of all eligible
workers. H. EHRMANN, POLITICS IN FRANcE 173 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Eunm.IANN,
POLITICS]; H. LEsIRE-OGREL, LE SYNDICAT DANS LEFN\TRFPRtSE 128 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as LEsIRE-OGREL].
4. LORAWIN, supra note 1, at 164. For example, when C.G.T. Secretary-General Seguy
returned from negotiations at the height of the 1968 strikes and presented his gains to
the rank and file at a huge Renault plant, twelve thousand workers booed him. The
C.G.T. leadership scurried back to the bargaining table. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1968, at
8, col. 1.
5. The current attitudes of the two major unions may be summarized as follows: In
the wake of the 1968 outburst, the C.G.T. has emphasized the need for contact with
the masses and for labor unity. As a consequence, it has given priority to rank-and-file
grievances. It has refused no-strike pledges which would block renegotiation as pressure
develops from below and expressed a preference for action by statute rather than by
contract, in order to achieve relative stability with a minimum of commitment.
The C.F.D.T. has been even more open to spontaneous worker action. The unions'
objectives include worker control, democratic planning, and inprovement in the quality
of worker life. See Reynaud, Dassa, Dassa & Maclouf, Les Adnements de inai et juin
1968 et le systme franfais de relations professionelles, [1971] SOC=OLocE DU TRAVAIL 73,
191, 192-205, 208 [hereinafter cited as Reynaud].
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the unions. The federation, embracing approximately 900,000 concerns
employing over six million workers,0 has substantial influence on the
content of collective bargaining through the staff it provides its af-
filiates. Still, some institutional barriers are evident: The permanent
staff of the employer organization is isolated from its constituents;
employer ideology decrees enterprise autonomy, with the association
intervening only on problems of an industry or regional nature; liaison
officers to the association hold ambiguous positions in their firm's
chain of command.7
Management even views government planning as an additional
mechanism for its control. Indeed,
in some ways, the development of French planning in the 1950s
can be viewed as an act of voluntary collusion between senior
civil servants and the senior managers of big business. 8
The State. The French government plays a far greater role in deter-
mining the conditions of employment than do American labor agen-
cies. Minimum wages, vacations, hours, and other aspects of work
are set by law.0 Conciliation of most collective disputes is mandatory, 10
and mediation may be invoked by the government in major disputes."
The state also plays a major role in collective bargaining ranging from
periodic discussions over minimum wages to incessant prodding by
agencies such as the "Minist~re de Commerce" on the details of col-
lective agreements. 12
B. Labor Relations in the Plant
With the government as their apparent ally, the managers of French
industry exercise a degree of dominance that would appall most Ameri-
can labor leaders. By law, the employer is given the power to promul-
gate rbglement intdrieur, regulations which govern daily life in the
plant.13 Unions have only recently won legal recognition of their right
6. S. HOLT, Six EUROPEAN STATES 67 (1970).
7. Reynaud, supra note 5, at 88-89.
8. A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 120 (1969).
9. Legislation regulates hiring practices, family allowances, and health insurance. Un-
employment insurance is provided for in collective agreements negotiated at the na.
tional level and often extended by government decree. F. MEYERS, THE STATE AND GOV-
ERNMENT EMPLOYEES UNIONS IN FRANCE 6-7 (1971).
10. If conciliation procedures are not provided in the collective agreement, the dis.
pute goes to a tripartite commission where the public member plays the pivotal role.
11. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 52, 59.
12. Sellier, L'dvolution des negociations collectives dans la siddrurgie et la indtallurgic
en France (1950-1969), [1970] DROIT SOCIAL 431, 447.
13. LEnsiP-OGRui, supra note 3, at 69-70; C. TRAv. Liv. I, art. 22a (30c cd. Petits
Codes Dalloz 1959).
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to organize at the plant level, and the extent of this and other es-
sential union powers remains vaguely defined. Finally, the primary
mechanism for consultation by workers, the plant committee, is largely
ineffective.
In composing plant regulations, the employer must submit his
proposals to the plant committee and the government's Labor Inspec-
tor. The former, however, is limited to suggesting changes and the
latter to retracting or modifying provisions which are contrary to
statute. As a result, the regulations routinely contain clauses of great
breadth such as prohibitions on "all activity alien to this firm," or
"all political or philosophical discussion."' 4 With such discretion, man-
agement exercises near-complete control over discipline.G By the use
of "temporary suspensions," employers commonly use such prohibitions
to circumvent the spirit of the Labor Code, which ostensibly limits
disciplinary fines to certain offenses and to one-fourth of the worker's
wage.' 6
As a result of the 1968 unrest, the employers have been forced to
yield-on paper-some of their power."1 In 1969, for example, the
C.N.P.F. and all the representative unions reached an agreement on
employment security which provided for consultation with workers
through their plant committees in the event of mass lay-offs. The
agreement stipulates priorities in rehiring and requires firms to re-
classify or retrain any workers laid off. Another national agreement
in 1970 placed workers on a monthly salary basis, guaranteeing a
measure of job security and fringe benefits formerly limited to white
collar workers.' 8
The real effect of these developments, however, remains to be seen.
The individual French worker is still often at the mercy of his em-
ployer. In the past, employees have been legally discharged for smok-
ing in the washstand, taking a forty-five minute rest after eleven hours
of work, or having union magazines in their lockers. If the employee is
14. LEsma-OGREL, supra note 3, at 71.
15. Id. at 72. The disciplinary power of management is nowhere found in the Code
and actually rests on judge-made law. In a 1945 decision, the Cour de Cassation (the prin-
cipal appellate court) stated:
The employer disposes of a disciplinary power inherent in his character and which,
in the absence of limiting internal rules, he may use subject only to judicial review.
Id. at 73.
16. Id. at 75; C. TRAY. Liv. I, art. 22b (30e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1959).
17. See Le mouvement syndical et ie bilan social de la "nouvelle sociatl," 80 RE%-UE
D'EcoNo. IE POLrrIQUE 936 (1970); Camerlynck, Le bilan de 'alne 1969 en droit du
travail frangais, 25 RELATIoNs INDuSMIELLEs 369; N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1969, at 2, col. 4;
id., Mar. 22, 1970, at 41, col. 5; id., July 11, 1970, at 3. col. 5.
18. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1970, at 41, col. 5.
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temporarily suspended-another favorite management tactic-the em-
ployer's decision will be reversed only if the worker is able to prove
that the employer's purpose was purely to injure the worker and that
it was not in the interest of the enterprise. Even if the court over-
turns the discharge or suspension, the worker will receive damages
only if he can show that the dismissal was abusif: that the motive for
dismissal was anti-union, a violation of contract, or the product of
procedural failures. 19
Courts have played some part in entrenching management's domi-
nance by interpreting restrictively recent legislative efforts to redress
the balance. For example, the Cour de Cassation has held that ad-
visory commissions on discipline established by collective contract and
authorized by statute were not meant to deal with layoffs.2 0 Similarly,
though the law of 1950 provided that a strike does not create a breach
of contract (except in the case of "major fault"), 21 the courts have per.
mitted firms to hire strike-breakers and then refuse to rehire strikers.
Indeed, the primary difficulty with legislative reforms has been that
the judges interpret each section of the Labor Code in the light of
their conservative notions of the civil law, rather than viewing the
entire Code as a comprehensive law for the protection of workers.2 -
But the most important reason for the comparative weakness of
French unions is their ambiguous status under the law. Until 1969,
unions had no right to organize and collect dues within the plant or
to appoint plant delegates with the power to sign collective agree-
ments. Management had no obligation to permit union organizing or
to deal with union representatives, and by and large, it refused to do
either. 23 The 1969 reforms, while establishing the principle of plant
organization, imposed significant limitations-which American work-
ers would almost certainly regard as crippling-on the exercise of that
right.
The second article of the 1969 law, for example, limits the right to
establish a local to "representative" unions recognized by the govern-
ment at the national level. It thus precludes protection of many locals
19. LESutE-OGREL, supra note 3, at 93-100. There is language in the Code du Travail
(C. TPAv. Liv. I, art. 23 (30e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1959)) which indicates that a judge
could require the employer to provide his motive for discharge, but the courts have
either refused to require justification or have accepted very broad excuses. Thus, the
Cour de Cassation reversed a judgment ordering further inquiry where the justification
given was that the worker was "professionally unsatisfactory." [1963] Bull. Civ. IV 40.
20. LEsiRE-OGREL, supra note 3, at 98; [1965] Bull. Civ. IV 782.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 99-100.
23. A. STURMTHAL, WORKERS COUNCIL 47-49 (1964) [hereinafter cited as STURMrTHAL].
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which sprang into being in the wake of the 1968 strike and which are
not formal units of such nationally recognized unions. Furthermore,
due to its size limitation (to firms with fifty or more employees), the
new statute does not apply to one-third of all industrial workers and
three-fourths of all those engaged in commerce; the law also excludes
all public enterprise. Although it permits dues collection in the plant,
it does not apply specifically to the place or time of work; it limits
the right to distribute literature to that which is "professional" in
nature.24
The 1969 reforms, moreover, failed to address the coercive prac-
tices applied by employers to inhibit unionization-practices which
persist despite the formal recognition of union rights. Employers
have handicapped locals' elections, for example, by restricting the
posting of announcements.25 They have placed union leaders in jobs
which isolate them from fellow workers, and have often refused to
meet regularly with leaders who enjoy genuine worker support. Firing
union organizers, even in the face of government opposition, is still a
common ploy.20
The institutions and individuals responsible for representing work-
er interests and grievances on a day-to-day basis are also unable to
redress management's dominance. A number of representatives-shop
stewards, union delegates, plant committee members-play some formal
role. It has been argued that the impotence of these representatives
may be due to the splintering of authority among them. But a more
realistic explanation may be that employers have refused to concede
any authority to any of them.2 7
Plant committees, which are required in every firm with more than
fifty employees, are composed of both workers and managers, and
must include at least one member nominated by the unions. If plants
24. Statute of Dec. 27, 1968, [1968] J.O. 12403. See also de La Gressaye, La preesnce
du syndicat dans Lentreprise, [1969] 3 DROIT SOCIAL 153, 155-56.
25. At the Ivry plant in 1966, five posters were used to announce elections for a
firm employing 7,000 workers.
26. For example, in April 1965 management-imposed layoffs at a television manu-
facturing concern precipitated a union drive. The C.G.T., F.O., and C.F.D.T. all de-
manded elections. The company refused and fired nine organizers. The Inspector tried
to mediate, and an appeal was taken. A meeting took place under the auspices of the
director of manpower; although the company threatened to close if its actions were
not upheld, the Inspector refused to sustain the company. The company made good
its threat to shut down.
27. H6l ne Sinay, for example, argues that this multiplicity of worker representatives
is not objectionable, since the functions they perform are different. She sees the only
true overlap between the stewards and union delegates in the area of grievance handling.
It may be argued, however, that the 1968 statute is an invitation to future bickering
and labor movement weakness. Sinay, Le degrd d'intensitd de la pr&ence syndicale dans
'entreprise, [1969] DRorr SOCIAL 454.
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complied (and workers sought compliance) with the law, there would
be 23,000 such committees in France. Yet at last count, Le Monde
reported that only 6,000 exist, and that only about fifty percent were
operating well. 28 In theory, the committees must be consulted by
management on matters of organization, administration, layoffs, plant
regulations, and vacations. They must be informed regarding profits
and losses and may make suggestions as to profit, product, or price
changes. In fact, however, plant committees rarely exercise any in-
fluence in matters outside the area of medical and social services.20
Most do not even concern themselves with operational matters. Em-
ployers often categorically refuse consultation on wages and ignore
suggestions on plant regulations."0 The usual employer tactic is to
consult post facto as to economic matters or to swamp the committees
with trivia, thus taking advantage of the workers' lack of expertise.
Shop stewards and union delegates similarly offer little more than
the shadow of representation. Although both play a role in collecting
dues, distributing literature, and holding union meetings, they differ
from each other in one important respect: The former are elected by
workers, while the latter are appointed by union officials outside the
firm. Neither has authority to achieve resolution of employee
grievances that are binding on employers. Workers thus often prefer
to pursue remedies through other channels,3 ' and the use of stewards
for handling grievances has declined. Finally, since stewards often
face employer discrimination, the post is not a very popular one. 32
Specialization of leaders' roles in these positions tends to widen the
gap between the rank and file and their leadership. Different in-
dividuals present grievances as personnel delegates, deal with man-
agement as members of the plant committees, and negotiate as union
28. Le Monde, Feb. 11, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
29. Such services include insurance, the canteen, vacation homes, kindergartens, hos-
pitals, clubs, and relief funds.
30. STURMTHAL, supra note 23, at 39-40.
31. Primarily the labor courts. See pp. 818-19; STURMTHAL, supra note 23, at 31.
32. Id. at 32. Theoretically, any dismissal of a personnel delegate must be cleared
with the plant committee, and its objection can be overriden only with the approval
of the Labor Inspector. The same procedure was extended by later statutes to members
of the plant committee, former members, candidates, and union representatives. But the
courts have distorted these statutes, holding that they may review the decision of the
Inspector but that damages may not be awarded until the litigation, including all ap.
peals, is completed. [1952] D. Jur. 290 (Cass. civ. soc. 21 Feb. 1952); see LaSIRa.O-REL,
supra note 3, at 102-03. By such time, the worker may be long unemployed. Moreover, even
when an employee successfully appeals an adverse decision of the Inspector, reinstatement
will not be granted. Thus, even if the employer loses at every level, he need not rehlre.
He can always fire a committee or union member if he is willing to pay damages which
rarely exceed four months salary. [1964] D. Jur. 578 (Cass. civ. soc. 1 July 1964); sce
LErsmR-OGREL, supra, at 104.
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leaders. Consequently, the ties between the three roles are weak, and
grievances raised in the plant committees rarely result in collective
contract provisions.
C. Collective Bargaining
The structure and custom of collective bargaining in France also
enhance employer power. The right of unions to negotiate and the
"duty to bargain" have never been legally recognized, either by the
courts or by statute. Reforms since 1969 have altered the system in
some respects-resulting, for example, in collective contracts which
for the first time link wage increases to the cost of living. But there
is no certainty that such innovations will become a national trend.
Indeed, it would be surprising if certain deeply-ingrained and widely-
accepted practices cease to prevail.
French labor contracts typically shun the detailed content of a full
collective agreement and thus grant management considerable dis-
cretion in determining the greater part of wages through bonuses. Most
agreements concern only wages and benefits and there they set only
minima which employers may increase. Such discretion is clearly in
accord with the French theory of enterprise autonomy. Although
unions have criticized the system, 33 stipulations as to bonuses are
rarely incorporated in collective contracts. 34 Recent accords tying wage
increases to the cost of living-for example, in the electricity and gas
industries35-may, however, ultimately produce some restrictions on
the employer's power. But unions were compelled to make conces-
sions of their own in return for this gain-agreeing not to reopen the
issue of wages during a two-year period. Hence, even in the long run,
such provisions may not alter the balance of power.
Management dominates the collective bargaining process itself in
a more basic sense through its ability to choose its opponent-that is,
the bargaining unit with which it will deal. Very little bargaining
occurs at the plant level and virtually none in concerns with more
than one plant. Instead, the usual pattern is for several unions to
bargain simultaneously with many employers (represented by a single
employer association) at the level of a locality or region. Although the
determination of the bargaining unit is left to the parties, typically
33. F. $aLLUt, STRATcIE DE LA Lurm SoCiALE 167 (1961) [hercinafter cited as Suzn,ST-RATEGM].
34. Id. at 173.
35. Camerlynck, Le bilan de Pannde 1969 en droit du travail frangais, 25 Rzxtal.s
INDUsTRELLEs 369 (1969).
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the decision of the employer is controlling.30 Since these accords set
only minima, additional terms may be negotiated in the individual's
contract, so that a worker may be simultaneously covered by a broad
regional accord, a national pact on special matters, and informal plant
level agreements. When two or more agreements overlap, simulta-
neous application has been held permissible, 7 with the result that
workers at a lower level cannot waive gains obtained regionally or
nationally.38
Management typically pushes most critical bargaining to the re-
gional level, which is most advantageous to it.a0 At the local level, there
is the fearsome prospect of "workers' control." At the national level,
its union adversaries are likely to be more expert. In 1955 the na-
tionalized Renault Corporation did conclude a detailed plant-level
agreement on every aspect of employment. 40 But few firms have fol-
lowed Renault's experiment. By forcing negotiations at a regional
level, management gives the unions the worst of both worlds: Labor
has neither the competence of the higher levels, nor the rank-and-
file support of the plant. Bargaining at the regional level tends to
undercut union cohesiveness and enhance the myriad fissures that
plague labor-fissures between union leaders and rank and file, be-
tween wage earners and salaried workers, and among various skill
categories. 41 At the regional level, workers in the advanced sectors are
likely to be disadvantaged since negotiations typically gravitate toward
a lowest common denominator including the unskilled.
Apart from the government sessions, management need not bargain
with all representative unions, or only with representative unions. The
upshot is a continually shifting pattern of multi-union bargaining.42
36. LoaVI, supra note 1, at 190-97.
37. M. DESPAX, CONVENTIONS CoLLFcrivEs, 7 TRAITE DE DROIT DO TRAVAIL 805 (G.
Camerlynck ed. 1966).
38. LoRIIN, supra note 1, at 213.
39. SELLIER, STRATEmE, supra note 33, at 187.
40. The Renault accords, hailed as a turning point in French labor relations, con-
tained provisions regarding exhaustion of conciliation before resort to strikes or lock-
outs, a commitment by management to a four percent wage increase during each of the
following two years, and provisions for holidays, sickness, and retirement. A cost.of
living committee was established to attempt to maintain purchasing power, though final
decisions were left with management. Id. at 197-98.
The no-strike pledges were suspect among unions. The experiment was looked upon
with favor by management, who thought the new accords would lessen turnover and
provide labor peace. However, small and medium sized firms were antagonistic, fearing
that the concessions made in the new agreements would be generalized and extended.
41. On the regional level, the difficulty of attaining unity among the several unions
prevents labor from taking the initiative for a settlement. Management recognizes the
union's weaknesses and turns to mediation only when local firms seem too ready to
yield to union pressure. Id. at 178-85.
42. LoRwiN, supra note 1, at 205-08.
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However, if a collective agreement is signed by one union but re-
jected by another, it nevertheless applies to all the workers including
members of the union which refused.43 Finally, since no-strike clauses
are not employed, unions may still strike during the term of contract,
whether or not they signed it. 4
The role of the government in the collective bargaining process is
an important one. Indirectly, as a major employer itself, it sets a pat-
tern for private bargains. It may intervene directly to shape the out-
come of private negotiation by providing subsidies that permit in-
creased wage settlements. 45 It has the power to "extend" agreements,
at the request of any representative union or employer group or the
Minister of Labor, so that the contract between a particular union
and management groups becomes binding on the entire industry with
quasi-statutory effect.46 With complete discretion, it may convene con-
ciliation or bargaining sessions to settle major disputes.4 T It gives
unions the right to participate in those sessions by recognizing them
as "representative." Finally, through its substantial planning and con-
trol authority over the economy in general, the government exercises
immense power over the real effect of any agreement reached privately.
In 1970, labor won a long-sought reform in the level of the mini-
mum wage-linking it to the average wage level throughout the coun-
try.4 Formerly, the minimum wage tended to determine the average
level-rather than vice versa-since contract negotiations throughout
the country typically awaited and reacted to the minimum level set
by the government after consultation with labor and management
43. Savatier, French Report, 18 Rrroras L. REv. 375, 386 (1964).
44. F. MEYERS, supra note 9, at 5-6.
45. In the metal industry a variety of factors, including union action and strikes,
helped bring about real negotiations and agreement. Economic difficulties on the part
of business and state intervention were pivotal factors. But the critical factor in exerting
pressure for agreement was the government's promise of a subsidy in the event of wage
increase.
46. From 1945 to 1965 of 202 contracts concluded at the national level, fifty.six were
extended; of 143 regional accords, twenty-two extended; of 382 local agreements, eighteen
extended. DEsPAx, CoNvErrMoNs CoLLEcrivEs, supra note 37, at 360.
The obligatory content of extended contracts has been one obstacle to wider appli-
cation. The Minister of Labor has apparently avoided full use of extension out of
concern for marginal firms.
47. When parties have not provided by contract for conciliation, they must resort
to government panels. Moreover, the role of the state in the ongoing process of bar-
gaining is manifest. For example, Francois Sellier reports that the Ministry of Social
Affairs encouraged a steel industry agreement in the 1960's concerning sick pay realizing
that such an accord would take pressure off the state's compensation system. Sellier,
L'volution des nigociations collectives dans la siddrugic et la mYtallurgie en France (1950-
1969), [1970] 9 DROrT Soc.l 431, 433.
48. Camerlynck, Le bilan de l'annde 1970 en droit du travail frangais, 26 R. o.%s
IND usTRmLEs 490, 491 (1970).
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representatives. 4 But the 1970 measure has scarcely diluted the gov-
ernment's power in this area. Paris continues to compute the "average"
level, thereby presumably setting the mark for the next round of
regional and local negotiations.
Thus, the French worker's wages, hours, and conditions of em-
ployment are determined in large part by forces beyond his control-
by a bargaining process dominated by his employer, by a government
with sweeping economic powers, and by independent economic trends.
As one commentator has summarized the situation:
In France the real income of the wage earning group as a whole,
even in the short run, is determined more by price changes and
the incidence of indirect taxation than by money wage read-
justments. . . . Bargaining on money wages is to a great extent
a form of political and economic competition among different
groups within the working class. 0
D. Settling Grievances
Once contracts are concluded, disputes over their validity, interpre-
tation, and execution are assigned to four primary mechanisms: con-
ciliation, mediation, arbitration, and the labor courts. The first three
deal with collective disputes while labor courts settle individual ones
between an employer and his employees. Since the former have been
largely ineffective, many collective disputes have been defined as "in-
dividual," so as to bring them within the labor courts' jurisdiction.
These courts have the advantages of speed, economy, expertise, and
informality. Still, they may grant only limited remedies, so that sur-
mounting the individual/collective fiction is only a limited solution.
Moreover, reliance on such courts has reduced the unions' role in
grievance settlement to insignificance.
By law, parties must submit disputes to a conciliation commission,
whether or not such a step is contractually mandated. The commis-
sions are statutory, tripartite bodies-with the government member
playing a decisive role as president-which exist at the departmental,
regional, and national level. Conciliation failure is common, since
there is little incentive to agree. Other mechanisms such as the courts
are then available,r' and the parties may engage in a strike or lockout
while conciliation is in process. Thus, the statutory mechanism is
49. LORWIN, supra note 1, at 222-23.
50. Id. at 219.
51. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 49.
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little more than a pressurized form of collective bargaining. Of some
1800 disputes submitted to conciliation between 1950 and 1967, 427
succeeded, 120 partly succeeded and 1,252 failed.52
A conciliation attempt is not, however, a prerequisite to invoking
the second mechanism, mediation, involving intervention of a third
party.53 If one party desires mediation, he may petition the president
of a conciliation commission; if the petition is granted, the adversary
must join. Moreover, the Minister of Labor can initiate mediation
even if neither party seeks it. Mediation, however, has not proven
much more effective than conciliation. Although the Minister of Labor
may publish the mediator's recommendation in order to exert pres-
sure on the parties, the recommendation is not binding. The mecha-
nism is now used only in cases large enough to justify the use of
prestigious mediators, who may bring to bear the force of their extra-
ordinary expertise or reputation. 4
Arbitration, the third mechanism, is rarely used. It is not compulsory
in France by law and is rarely stipulated by contract. One reason for
this fact is that while the procedure is voluntarily instituted, any award
is binding. 5 Another major reason why it is employed only a few
times a year 56 is the difficulty in agreeing on the arbitrator. Contractual
arbitration clauses normally specify only a procedure and arbitrator,
who may be a single person or a panel. Both parties tend to dislike
the discretion allowed arbitrators, out of fear that their collective
agreement will be overridden. Unions particularly resist such clauses
because they are less tightly organized at the plant level, where arbi-
tration would occur and are reluctant to relinquish the strike weapon
to obtain arbitration promises.T More fundamentally, private arbi-
tration seems contrary to the French tradition of state intervention
and judicial decree.
Because arbitration of individual employee grievances is rare in
France, 58 the major burden of settling such disputes falls on the fourth
52. Id. at 54.
53. Decree of May 5, 1955, [1955] J.O. 4493; amended by Decree of June 11, 1955,
[1955] J.O. 5923; Statute of July 26, 1957, [1957] J.O. 7459; Decree of July 18, 1958,[1958] J.O. 6801.
54. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 59.
55. Id. at 61, n.41; Statute of Feb. 11, 1950, [1950] J.O. 1688, as amended Statute
of July 26, 1957 [1957] J.O. 7459.
56. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 62-68.
57. Under the 1936-39 system, where compulsory arbitration was effective, the gov-
ernment was socialist, the unions strong, and the employers unorganized. Today the
situation is reversed. Id. at 69-70, 77.
58. W. MCPHERSON & F. MEYERS, THE FRENct LABOR COURTS: Ju)GME.F"-r BY PEERS
(1966) [hereinafter cited as MCPHERSON & MEYERS].
817
The Yale Law Journal
mechanism, the labor courts.'; These are permanent, semi-judicial
bodies created by decree and composed of equal numbers of manage-
ment and union representatives."0 Reliance on them exemplifies the
common belief pervading much of French labor relations that all em-
ployees are entitled to the same minimum protection, and that the
responsibility for providing such protection lies with the state. The
unions' minor role in grievance settlement is thus limited to tasks such
as the screening of complaints.
The limitation of the courts' jurisdiction to "individual" disputes-
those involving one employer and one employee 0l-derives from the
theory that the courts should be restricted to grievances arising from
the individual employment contract. 2 However, the Cour de Cassa-
tion has held that several individuals with similar claims do not trans-
form an individual dispute into a collective one; rather they constitute
merely a series of individual disputes. 3 Reacting to the ineffectiveness
of the mechanisms for resolving collective disputes, many lower courts
have exploited this theory to enlarge their jurisdiction,0 4 often allow-
ing the parties' characterization to control. 5 The express terms of the
individual contract of employment are commonly only the starting
point for their examination, since under French law that contract
sweeps in the requirements of statutes, the collective contract, oral
or written agreements, and even custom.00
The first step in consideration by the labor court is compulsory
conciliation by a panel of one employee and one employer judge. If
conciliation is successful, the agreement is incorporated in a "proces
verbal de conciliation" which is enforceable just as any other judg-
59. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 19.
60. Each labor court is established by a decree, and may have sections covering four
areas: industry (blue collar), commerce (white collar), agriculture, and miscellaneous.
Decree of Dec. 22, 1958, [1958] J.O. 11621. If a labor court has no section for a par-
ticular type of action, those cases go to the ordinary local court. "Cadres" (white collar
and managerial personnel) have the option of resorting to the ordinary courts in any
case. MCPHERSON & MEYERS at 22.
In 1965, there were over two hundred labor courts throughout France; yet It is esti-
mated that one-third of all individual labor disputes cannot come before a labor court
due to either a lack of any court in the vicinity or of one with an appropriate section.
Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 19.
61. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 9-11.
62. Id.; MCPHERSON & MEYERS, supra note 58, at 24.
63. [1951] Gazette du Palais II 261 (Cass. civ. soc. 21 June 1951). By contrast a col-
lective dispute turns on the rights or interests of a group of workers. The group may
or may not be a union; it may be a local group or a national one; and It may be
opposed by one or several employers. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 10.
64. [1960] D. Jur. 401 (Cass. civ. soc. 3 Feb. 1960).
65. [1960] D. Jur. 688 (Cass. civ. soc. 23 June 1960). See also Blanc-Jouvan, supra
note 3, at 11.
66. MCPHERSON & MEYERS, supra note 58, at 24; Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 6;
DEsPAX, CONVENTIONS COLLECTavES, supra note 37, at 76-77.
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ment. Since conciliation rarely succeeds-indeed, success in concilia-
tion has declined over the past twenty years-most cases go to a judg-
ment session.67 This session entails a hearing before two employer and
two employee judges. Some commentators have noted that often the
whole process is used by the employer to delay compensation or merely
for spite.68
Still, the court's record is relatively impressive: In all, final decision
is reached in some thirty-five to forty percent of the cases, some 20,000
per year. The bipartite nature of the courts apparently does not spur
bitter partisanship, and the interest of the lay judges in maintaining
their neutral position precludes deadlocks which would require the
intervention of a government judge.
Nonetheless, the protection afforded workers by the courts has been
criticised as "illusory"0' 9 because of strict limitations on the remedies
they may grant. As is generally true under French law,"0 the court can
grant only damages-and not specific performance-when a party fails
to execute a contract. Thus the labor court cannot order the reinstate-
ment of a discharged worker: Most workers are consequently reluctant
to resort to the courts prior to termination, and the labor court mecha-
nism often has the effect merely of reducing the unions' role without
providing effective remedies. In short, its stress on individual grievances
and the discouragement of collective action furthers management's
ability to divide and conquer.
E. Strikes, Lockouts, Street Conflict
The ultimate weapon of French workers is direct action-the strike,
plant occupation, sequestration of management, and the ultimatum.
French law, however, is not always hospitable to such tactics. The con-
stitution of 1946 guaranteed the right to strike "within the framework
of the laws which regulate it,"'' and the constitution of 1958 incorpo-
rates this provision by reference.72 But the courts have limited the right
by excluding certain actions from the definition of strike and by con-
sidering others under penal provisions prohibiting "interference with
the free exercise of industry and work."73
67. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 30-33; C. TRAv. Liv. IV, art. 57, 67a (30c ed. Perits
Codes Dalloz 1959).
68. McPHERSoN & MEYERS, supra note 58, at 41.
69. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 3, at 36.
70. Id. at 34.
71. Preamble to Constitution of 1946, [1946] J.O. 9166.
72. Preamble to Constitution of 1958, [1958] J.O. 9151.
73. Kanowitz, The Strike and Lockout Under French Labor Law, 9 ST. Louis L.J. 211,
213-15 (1964). C. PEN. art. 414-15 (56e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1959).
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Political strikes and lockouts are not protected. According to certain
judicial decisions, an economic action must attain a sufficient level of
participation to be a protected strike. In the case of a strike which
attracts only a portion of the work force, an employer must continue
to provide work for those who remain unless the strike is of such
magnitude as to amount to force majeure. But "rotating strikes," where
there is a planned sharing of picketing, and slowdowns are not pro-
tected, and the employer may lockout without notice. Paradoxically,
occupation of a plant, though subject to criminal sanctions, does not
breach the contract for purposes of reemployment. 74 Finally, the uni-
lateral lockout receives different judicial treatment than does the
strike. The employer need only resort to conciliation before he en-
gages in unilateral lockout.
For much of their history, French unions "viewed the conclusion of
a mutually binding collective agreement as inadmissible class col-
laboration." 75 As a result, the strike has been used more as a warning
to management that it must rectify some objectionable situation than
as a means of reaching agreement. This absence of a clear relation-
ship between strikes and negotiations has accentuated the role of the
state. Indeed, the primary aim of the strike is often to provoke state
intervention. Major emphasis is therefore placed on solidarity demon-
strations and public disruptions which will produce political gains-
gains thought to be proportionately greate than those achieved
through parliamentary action. 70 The events of May 1968 were the
most dramatic manifestation of such power, but it was present in the
violence both before and after those chaotic days.77
74. The 1950 collective bargaining law stipulates that a strike, instead of destroying
the employment contract, merely suspends it. This suggests that striking workers must
be rehired. But French courts have held that it is not breach of contract on the part
of the employer to refuse to rehire a worker if the employer has hired a replacement
during the course of the strike: the refusal to rehire is approved on the basis of the
obligation to the new worker. [1952] D. Jur. 706 (Cass civ. soc. 24 July 1952). But cf.
H. SINAY, LA GREVE, 6 TRAITE DE DROIT Du TRAVAIL 218 (G. Camerlynck ed. 1966) for
the proposition that this case is an aberration, and generally, the statute is followed.
75. MEYERS, supra note 9, at 24.
76. See SELLIER, STRATEGIE, supra note 33, at 299-309.
77. In 1969 strikes spread throughout France on the eve of Parliamentary debate on
the economy. There were marches in dozens of cities; in Paris, government offices were
occupied for hours; Lyons was paralyzed by purposely stalled automobiles; clashes with
police erupted. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1969, at 3, col. 5. At the Batignolles plant IlII
Nantes in 1971 workers ransacked the plant, destroyed files, and threw typewriters out
windows. Id., Jan. 28, 1971, at 4, col. 5. And in January 1972, a strike at the shipyards
of Brest was accompanied by sequestration of management. Le Monde, Jan. 26, 1972,
at 23, col. 1. Clearly, group, class, ideological, and generational antagonisms were not
obliterated by the Gaullist electoral victories. See also EtIRNIANN, POLITICS, Supra note 3,
at 332-43.
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II. Functional Analysis of the System
An application of functional analysis shifts our approach from an
examination of the system institution by institution, to an analysis of
the tasks performed by that system. Instead of a mere static descrip-
tion, it can provide a more systematic method for selecting strategies
for change. The framework to be used here is that developed in Com-
parative Politics by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell.1 While
Almond and Powell suggest that a political system may be analyzed in
several different respects, two seem particularly relevant-the system's
conversion process and its resulting capabilities. 79
The conversion process has to do with the internal functioning of
a system: The way in which demands are formulated (interest articula-
tion) and combined into alternative courses of action (interest aggrega-
tion); and the manner in which the rules which govern the actors in
the system-of both public law and private agreement-are formulated
(rule making), applied (rule application), and enforced (adjudication).80
Capability analysis evaluates how well the system as a whole per-
forms. Almond and Powell assess such performance,,by five tests: the
extractive, distributive, symbolic, regulative, and responsive capabili-
ties.8 ' The extractive involves obtaining resources from one member
of the system so that they may be transferred to another. The dis-
tributive pertains to the allocation of goods, services, and opportuni-
ties among both individuals and groups. The symbolic involves the
availability of symbols which tap popular beliefs, attitudes, and as-
pirations so as to maintain the legitimacy of the system. The regula-
tive refers to the exercise of control over the membership. Finally, re-
sponsiveness is judged in terms of how the system reacts: to whom, in
what areas of activity, and by what mechanisms.
A. The Labor Relations System as Part of the Entire Political System
Functional analysis can first provide us with an evaluation of the
labor relations system as a part of the larger political system of France.
The role of industrial relations in enhancing the extractive and dis-
tributive capabilities of the entire political system, though undoubted-
78. G. ALMOND & G. PowELL, Co.PARAnvE PoLrruis (1966) [hereinafter cted as
AMONID- & PowiEtL]. For a similar approach more familiar to lawyers and legal scholars
see Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 U.S.C.L. REv. 362, 387
(1971); The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systemns of Public Order, 53 Am.
J. INT. L. 1, 9. 17 (1959).
79. ALMoND & PowI. 28, 73-212.
80. Id. at 29.
81. Id. at 190-203.
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ly important, is largely a matter of labor economics beyond the scope
of this Note. By way of summary, we should note Lorwin's comment
that the labor sub-system has not-as its social theory would suggest-
produced a redistribution of wealth from the managerial to the work-
ing class. Rather,
increased benefits have come, not out of profits, but essentially
out of a redistribution of income within the working class, as
between direct wage and social wage recipients .... "The work-
ing class functions as a vast mutual aid association in which ... the
poor help out the poorer."'82
The contribution of French labor relations to the symbolic capability
of the political system seems to have been largely a negative one. The
extremes of Marxist ideology and of Social Darwinism have produced
antagonisms which make it difficult to compromise social differences.
Though the regulative capability of the political system is sub-
stantially supported by the French administrative bureaucracy, 83 it
is doubtful that the system of labor relations adds much to this capabili-
ty. Private labor 'accords are infrequent and rarely fill gaps in legisla-
tion; collective disputes often lead to economic force.
A more elusive question, however, is the degree to which the labor re-
lations system contributes to the responsiveness of the French political
system. Some authorities have suggested that the political system lacks
both responsiveness and authority. 84 And the labor sub-system often
seems unable to aid in this respect by resolving conflict among its
antagonistic groups.
Yet on closer examination, the labor relations system's contribution
in terms of responsiveness appears more complex. It might be argued
that a high level of conflict is the price paid for the protection of
individual rights and the opportunity for interest group activity. While
it is true that the weakness of the labor movement is partially caused
by multi-union bargaining, competition among unions may also be
viewed as a means of protecting the individual worker from the arbi-
trary power of union monopolies. Similarly, there are two views of
the importance of the government in labor relations. In one, the sys-
tem is a vast company-union run by the state. But in another, this
reliance on government decreases the dependence of the worker on
his union, allows him to utilize alternatives such as plant committees
82. LORWIN, supra note 1, ar 227.
83. See EHRMANN, POLITICS, supra note 3, at 131-42.
84. S. BEER & A. ULAM, PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT 278 (1962).
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and labor courts and keeps the unions honest. The French pattern
may thus shed some light-not altogether favorably-on the American
labor scene with its union monopolies and oligarchic control.
B. The Conversion Process of French Labor Relations
Just as functional analysis aids us in appreciating the labor sys-
tem's contribution to the overall political system, so we can now use
it to explain why the labor relations system behaves as it does.
1. Interest Articulation
Opportunity for interest articulation appears widely diffused in
the French labor system. In expressing complaints, the individual
worker has a choice among several unions and among a variety of
worker representatives or government officials.8s
But there are two aspects of interest articulation which reveal real
weakness. At the level of group articulation, available communication
channels often seem inadequate, as indicated by the lack of consulta-
tion with labor on matters of economic planning and, at the private
bargaining level, refusals by management to negotiate with a union
it disfavors . 6 This pattern seems to result from the multiplicity of
organizations articulating labor's views.8 7 The impression of extensive
interest articulation must be qualified, secondly, to take account of
the significant gap between the rank and file and its leadership.
2. Interest Aggregation
Aggregating interests in the French labor system is a difficult task.
On labor's side, internal differences may be suppressed by a power-
ful leadership. The resulting unified front may contribute to the
regulative capability, but simultaneously preclude a responsiveness
to divergent interests. On the other hand, where the leadership cannot
maintain member support, labor is fatally weakened. Because of this
frequent failure to achieve solidarity, regulation is often undertaken
by legislation or the initiative of employers.
Conflicting interests within the labor movement are, of course, also
found in the American system. But here, by a process of internal bar-
gaining, unions usually achieve a united front. In France, a number
85. See pp. 811-12 supra.
86. See pp. 810, 812, 814 supra.
87. See pp. 807, 811, 814 supra.
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of factors inhibit such aggregation. Critical among these-as illustrated
in 1968 and discussed above-is lack of rank-and-file support. In al-
most all enterprises, labor contact with the masses is restricted by
specialization of leaders' roles, failure to consult rank and file, and
anti-union judicial constructions and employer activity.88 At levels
higher than the enterprise, interest aggregation is inhibited by union
competition. With little to offer their followers, the unions are forced
to stress ideological distinctions-thus making compromise within the
movement even more difficult.
The possibility that these failures can ultimately be traced to French
attitudes toward bargaining and organizational authority is supported
by the fact that employers sometimes seem to have as much difficulty
as labor during a crisis. During 1968, for example, the employer as-
sociations seemed as paralyzed and incapable of effective action as the
unions. The resistance to common action, deference to decision makers,
and other aspects of organization seem deeply rooted in the behavior
of all sides in the labor relations system.
3. Rule Making
The true failure of the labor relations system is manifest in the proc-
ess of rule making, where the system performs badly or not at all. Rules
prescribed in other countries by collective bargaining are either or-
dained by statute or left to the discretion of the management.8 ° Beyond
this relative de-emphasis on private ordering, it also appears that rule
making, to the extent that it occurs at all, contributes instability to
the system's regulative capability. The inclination to negotiate at high-
er levels makes it difficult to adjust to local conditions. Moreover, the
procedures of collective bargaining themselves encourage delay: Since
few contracts terminate at a specified time and there is no duty to
bargain, delays accumulate and eventually the situation becomes a
crisis involving a resort to economic force. 0 Thus, just as the failings
of aggregation often mean that labor lacks the power necessary to
obtain responsiveness without provoking disorder, so at the rule mak-
ing stage, the nature of the procedures provokes further disruption.
4. Rule Application
Unlike the other stages of the conversion process, it is difficult to
generalize about rule application. Of course, the state is involved in
88. See pp. 810, 819 supra.
89. See p. 813 supra.
90. See p. 820 supra.
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many areas, but, as noted above, certain firms at times have flouted
statutory requirements. On other matters of internal plant operation,
rule application is left to management or is shared with the plant
committee.91
Though the facts of daily administration of statutes and contracts
are not clearly known, the deficiencies of the adjudicative function in-
dicate that application is rather sporadic. Accords may be one-sided or
lack means of enforcement. Even where the staff of an employer as-
sociation conscientiously seeks to monitor application, it may face
employers demanding firm autonomy. Unions retain their suspicion
of collective contracts, and are therefore reluctant to agree to no-strike
clauses.
5. Rule Adjudication
Effective rule adjudication in French labor relations is not consist-
ently available, due to the lack of an effective arbitration and media-
tion law. This is the principal reason that unions' interest shifts from
private rule making to protest action designed to invoke the powers
of the state.
As far as responsiveness is concerned, the absence of mechanisms for
the settlement of collective disputes adds to the system's inability to
adjust to a variety of situations. It is difficult to determine the degree
to which this is modified by the sub rosa use of the labor courts to
adjudicate collective disputes. But when confined to individual dis-
putes, the responsiveness of the adjudicative mechanism is doubtful.
The labor courts, while providing a remedial mechanism for non-
union as well as union members,9 2 are precluded from offering the all-
important remedy of reinstatement.
In thus summarizing the functioning of French labor relations, the
system's problems and peculiarities emerge rather clearly. Poor per-
formance in interest aggregation, rule making, and adjudication, lead
to periodic direct and disruptive labor actions aimed more at the public
and the state than at individual employers. Labor's difficulty in ag-
gregating interests promotes crisis as a means of mobilizing adherents.
Finally, in rule making and adjudication, the lack of institutions which
contribute significantly to the resolution of collective disputes again
forces labor to rely on the state.
91. See pp. 809-10.
92. ?.CPHERSON g. MEYERS, supra note 58, at 9. Blanc-Jouvan, The Statutes of the
Unorganized Workers, in DisruTE SEm.~NT IN FIVE NasrzN EuROPa.4N CouNTRES
35-38 (B. Aaron ed. 1969).
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Though somewhat more difficult to evaluate, the contribution of
the labor system to the responsive capability of the political system
does not seem to be significant: The weakness of labor means that
both systems are less responsive to the workers than they might be.
Moreover, the tendencies which produce a politics of "crisis liquida-
tion" result in a responsiveness which is too blunt to satisfy anyone.
During crisis, business and government are hurt by social conflict; dur-
ing calm, labor watches impotently as its hard-won gains are circum-
vented and construed out of existence.
III. Law and the Strategies of Change
It was suggested that one virtue of functional analysis is that it may
lead to a strategy for change which does not deal with institutions at
random, but rather treats the system as a whole. In light of the above
descriptions and categorizations, we may now suggest such a strategy.
While structural, economic, 93 and cultural 94 factors all undoubtedly
93. In 1962, Professor Arthur Ross suggested that traditional European labor relations
were changing due to the affluence of the post-World War II period. He argued that
the traditional systems were adapted to "decades marked by subsistence wages, frequent
spells of severe unemployment, and extreme bitterness between the classes." Ross, Pros-
perity and Labor Relations in Western Europe: Italy and France, 16 IND. & LABI. REL.
REv. 63, 64 (1962). In such times there was little hope for collective bargaining, and
therefore no need to avoid ideological conflict on that account; on the political level
where most action was focused, such conflict was useful in mobilizing support. Ross
argued that the situation should change with the coming of full employment, rapid
growth, tight labor markets, and advances in real earnings. Id. at 63.
Ross' analysis is helpful in understanding certain aspects of the system, such as the
process by which the lessening of economic pressure contributed to ideological splintering
and conflict among unions. However, as Ross acknowledged, the system cannot be ex-
plained without considering noneconomic factors such as C.G.T. insistence on the ide
ology of class warfare, C.F.D.T. emphasis on centralized bargaining, management, in.
transigence, and the crisis of Algeria which politicized all issues. Id. at 80-84. Moreover,
while some union decentralization is at last occurring, the worker strength at the plant
level posited by Ross' theory is not as clearly developing. See Delamotte, Recent Collective
Bargaining Trends in France, 103 INT. LABOR REV. 351, 372 (1971). Finally, even while
the "traditional" economic conditions existed, there were a number of sectors (,.' French
industry, such as textiles, with relatively congenial labor-managnement relations. The
explanation for this cooperation seems to be that there were serious splits among em-
ployers and a congruance of interests between labor and one important employer group.
SELLIER, STRATECIE, supra note 33, at 317-29.
Apart from the need for greater specificity in economic hypotheses, there are other
areas where economics fails us. For example, Ross suggested that increasing affluelce
would soften ideological divisions and class antagonisms. Yet a study by Richard Hamil.
ton found that increasing radicalism does not correlate with economic deprivation and
dissatisfaction. R. HAMILTON, AFFLUENCE AND THE FRENCH WORKER 275-78 (1967), Rather
union organization seemed critical and there was a close correlation between worker
radicalism and the size of the firm.
94. Many social scientists who have examined the political culture of France have
presented a picture of ineffective government, deeply divided classes, religious sectarian-
ism, and a generally apathetic or "anti-civic" polity. See, e.g., ALMOND & POWELL, supra
note 78, at 320-21; EH"IANN, supra note 3, at 309-12. Clearly, the ideological style and
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interact to produce the patterns of French labor relations, it is possible
to single out particular factors as dominant in certain areas. For exam-
ple, the slow shift in labor's strategy from a defensive to offensive one
seems most likely linked to economics: Instead of relying solely on
building minima into legislation, some development of the contract tool
and a rather dramatic emphasis on plant level organizing have been un-
dertaken. In other areas, cultural factors seem to predominate. The fail-
ure of interest aggregation, rejection of bargaining, and suspicion of
leadership, may all stem from cultural attitudes pervasive in French
society. Structural factors, usually secondary, are occasionally quite im-
portant: For example, the nearly total failure of the mediation law may
be laid to the absence of provisions for compulsory arbitration.
Developing a strategy of change thus involves identifying those as-
pects of the system which are true sources of weakness aid which are
also most amenable to change. In France, these relate principally to in-
terest aggregation. Yet French legislators, instead of focusing on interest
aggregation, intervened at the stage of rule making and rule application
by passing the 1955 mediation law. The law has been virtually a dead
letter. The weakness of the unions which required them to retain the
weapon of mass action made them resistant to binding arbitration.0 5
In short, the mediation law collided with the resistance to interest ag-
gregation, rooted deeply in economic, cultural, and structural factors.
As a first priority target, interest aggregation must be further an-
alyzed, however, to determine appropriate tactics for reform. For ex-
ample, it might be possible to move toward single representative
unions more on the American model. But more likely, given current
worker attitudes, this would only result in a sharp increase in wildcat
strikes. By contrast, reforming the law on dismissals so as to compel
employers to give valid reasons for such actions would not cut against
such ingrained worker attitudes. Such a move might thus decrease the
violence of strikes and increase the ability of unions to hold their mem-
bership. In addition, it might be possible to reform the channels by
which labor obtains access to state planning agencies; end the frag-
the failure of bargaining which inhibit interest aggregation and rule-making may reflect
a pervasive pattern of the political culture. The absence of informal grievance proce-
dures leading to the accumulation of unresolved disputes may result from a general
dislike of face-to-face relationships, as may the centralized nature of the entire bar-
gaining process. Similarly, suspicion toward authority makes it difficult for the unions
to maintain sustained mass support. In short, many of the characteristics of the labor
system conducive to union weakness, to an absence of low-level dispute settlement, and
to the consequential instability of the system as a whole, seem rooted in the political
culture.
95. SEasL, SiRAToEfi, supra note 33, at 178-79.
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mentation among plant committee, personnel representative, and
union representative; and provide the labor courts with the power of
reinstatement. Only if the unions are treated fairly and are then still
unable to attract adherents, should it be necessary to admit that a weak
labor movement is the price French workers are willing to pay for
individualism.
Having identified the stage of labor relations which is most amen-
able to change and having considered the tactics most likely to succeed,
one final step remains: to consider the long-term economic and cul-
tural forces which will handicap efforts to achieve short-term change
and which must be modified if long-term goals are to be accomplished.
For example, while the possible legal changes suggested above may in-
crease the capacity for interest aggregation, union efforts will continue
to confront deeply held social attitudes about bargaining and com-
promise. These in turn are affected by institutions throughout the so-
ciety. Thus, the reformer must consider recommending change in the
educational system, the bureaucracy, and other institutions which per-
petuate class hierarchy and an anti-civic instinct.
All of this is but an outline of the kind of thought which should
guide a strategy of reform. Undoubtedly, something like it already
goes on in the minds of all astute politicians or lawyers. What has been
suggested here is simply a more systematic approach. Hopefully such an
examination may suggest some insights to American observers. For
example, the consequences of overcentralization in the French system
may cause us to think twice about establishing even an advisory pay
board. We should also consider whether there is something about
monopoly unions that quashes worker rights and about pluralist sys-
tems which makes for labor impotence. Finally, in areas akin to labor
relations, such as race relations, the focus on factors such as interest
aggregation may in this country be as important as in France. But
while such insights may prove useful, the real purpose of this Note
has been to suggest that the student of labor law-foreign or domestic
-can profit from a systematic application of social science to the varied
patterns of industrial relations.
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